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WHAT I ATE FOR BREAKFAST AND OTHER
MYSTERIES OF JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING*
Alex Kozinskit
It is popular in some circles to suppose that judicial decision making
can be explained largely by frivolous factors, perhaps for example the
relationship between what judges eat and what they decide. Answering
questions about such relationships is quite simple-it is like being asked
to write a scholarly essay on the snakes of Ireland: There are none.
But as far back as I can remember in law school, the notion was
advanced with some vigor that judicial decision making is a farce. Under
this theory, what judges do is glance at a case and decide who should
win-and they do this on the basis of their digestion (or how they slept
the night before or some other variety of personal factors). If the judge
has a good breakfast and a good night's sleep, he might feel lenient and
jolly, and sympathize with the downtrodden. If he had indigestion or a
bad night's sleep, he might be a grouch and take it out on the litigants.
Of course, even judges can't make both sides lose; I know, I've tried. So
a grouchy mood, the theory went, is likely to cause the judge to take it
out on the litigant he least identifies with, usually the guy who got run
over by the railroad or is being foreclosed on by the bank. This theory
immodestly called itself Legal Realism.
Just to prove that even the silliest idea can be pursued to its illogical
conclusion, Legal Realism spawned Critical Legal Studies. As I under-
stand this so-called theory, the notion is that because legal rules don't
mean much anyway, and judges can reach any result they wish by invok-
ing the right incantation, they should engraft their own political philoso-
phy onto the decision-making process and use their power to change the
way our society works. So, if you accept that what a judge has for break-
fast affects his decisions that day, judges should be encouraged to have a
consistent diet so their decisions will consistently favor one set of liti-
gants over the other.
I am here to tell you that this is all horse manure. And, like all
horse manure, it contains little seeds of truth from which tiny birds can
take intellectual nourishment. The little truths are these: Under our law
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judges do in fact have considerable discretion in certain of their deci-
sions: making findings of fact, interpreting language in the Constitution,
statutes and regulations; determining whether officials of the executive
branch have abused their discretion; and, fashioning remedies for viola-
tions of the law, including fairly sweeping powers to grant injunctive re-
lief. The larger reality, however, is that judges exercise their powers
subject to very significant constraints. They simply can't do anything
they well please.
These constraints come in many forms, some subtle, some quite ob-
vious. I want to focus here only on three that I believe are among the
most important. The first, and to my mind the most significant, is inter-
nal: the judge's own self-respect. Cynics and academics (a redundancy)
tend to belittle this if they consider it at all. Don't make that mistake.
Judges have to look in the mirror at least once a day, just like everyone
else; they have to like what they see. Heaven knows, we don't do it for
the money; if you can't have your self-respect, you might as well make
megabucks doing leveraged buyouts.
More concretely, the job is just too big to be done by one person
alone. You are surrounded by eager young law clerks far too smart to be
fooled by nonsense. I know of no judge who will tell his law clerks: "I
want to reach this result, write me an opinion to get me there." You
have to give them reasons, and those reasons better be pretty good-any
law clerk worth his salt will argue with you if the reasons you give are
unconvincing. Should you choose to abandon principle to reach a result,
you will not be able to fool yourself into believing you're just following
the law. It will have to be a deliberate choice, and it's a choice that, by
and large, judges tend not to make. As Senator Thurmond said at my
investiture as Chief Judge of the Claims Court in 1982, "You are in a
different world when you put a robe on. It is something that just makes
you feel that you have got to do what is right, whether you want to or
not. I think the moment you put on that robe, you enter this ultra-
world." A little corny, perhaps, but true.
The second important constraint comes from your colleagues. If
you're a district judge, your decisions are subject to review by three
judges of the court of appeals. If you are a circuit judge, you have to
persuade at least one other colleague, preferably two, to join your opin-
ion. Even then, litigants petition for rehearing and en banc review with
annoying regularity. Your shortcuts, errors and oversights are merci-
lessly paraded before the entire court and, often enough, someone will
call for an en banc vote.
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If you survive that, judges who strongly disagree with your ap-
proach will file a dissent from the denial of en banc rehearing. If power-
ful enough, or if joined by enough judges, it will make your opinion
subject to close scrutiny by the Supreme Court, vastly increasing the
chances that certiorari will be granted. Even Supreme Court Justices are
subject to the constraints of colleagues and the judgments of a later
Court.
Now, don't get me wrong, just about any judge can get away with
cutting a corner here or there. There are too many cases and too little
time to catch all the errors, deliberate or unintentional. But what you
absolutely cannot get away with is abandoning legal principles in favor of
results on a consistent basis. Any judge who tries to do this cuts deeply
into his credibility and becomes suspect among his colleagues. There are,
from time to time, district judges whose decisions come to the court of
appeals with a presumption of reversibility. I have heard lawyers say,
with good reason, that they dread winning before those judges because it
becomes very difficult to defend their judgments on appeal. Circuit
judges who break the rules too often become especially vulnerable to en
banc calls and ultimately to reversal by the Supreme Court.
A case in point is my circuit's experience with stays in death penalty
cases. Twice in the past year, the Supreme Court has lifted stays issued
by some of my colleagues, letting executions go forward on schedule.
While it may be difficult to see a pattern in two instances, the circum-
stances surrounding the Supreme Court's actions lead me to believe the
Justices are beginning to view stays issued by our judges with far greater
suspicion than stays issued by judges of other courts. If this is true, it
means that stays entered by our judges are less likely to survive review by
the Supreme Court. My fear is that when a petitioner with a meritorious
claim comes along, we may have a hard time getting our stay to stick-
something that deeply concerns me.
The third important constraint on judicial excesses lies in the polit-
ical system, a constraint often overlooked but awesome nonetheless. By
its nature, the political process seldom reacts to specific cases, although it
does so from time to time. The passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991
was exclusively a response to five Supreme Court decisions from the re-
cent terms; Congress believed the Court had misread civil rights legisla-
tion and moved swiftly and decisively to overrule the decisions by
statute.
But the political process occasionally operates in even blunter ways.
Examples of these from the past are FDR's plan to pack the Supreme
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Court and proposals to clip the federal courts' jurisdiction over sensitive
matters.
A more recent example is the removal of three justices of the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court by the voters. There are many explanations for
why the justices were removed, and I'm sure that some of the other
speakers today know much more about the situation than I do. My own
impression is that the electorate was persuaded-rightly or wrongly-
that these three justices simply were not playing fair: They were using
the power of their office to engraft a political agenda onto the law.
Now, there is an unspoken premise to what I have said, namely that
there are more or less objective principles by which the law operates,
principles that dictate the reasoning and often the result in most cases. I
know you are taught to doubt this in law school, as I was; it is neverthe-
less true. Now, these principles are not followed by every judge in every
case, and even when followed, there is frequently some room for the exer-
cise of personal judgment.
But none of this means principles don't exist or that judges can use
them interchangeably or ignore them altogether. Let me give you an
example of one principle I think is extremely important: Language has
meaning. This doesn't mean every word is as precisely defined as every
other word, or that words always have a single, immutable meaning.
What it does mean is that language used in statutes, regulations, con-
tracts and the Constitution place an objective constraint on our conduct.
The precise line may be debatable at times, but at the very least the lan-
guage used sets an outer boundary that those interpreting and applying
the law must respect. When the language is narrowly drawn, the con-
straints are fairly strict; when it is drawn loosely they're more generous,
but in either case they do exist. Let me illustrate.
An example of a Constitutional provision that is very strict is con-
tained in Article II, Section 1, Clause 5: "No person except a natural
born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United States, at the time of the Adop-
tion of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the Office of the President
... ." This language allows little or no room for interpretation. While
there could possibly be some debate as to whether someone born of
American parents abroad would be considered a natural born citizen,
there is absolutely no room to argue that someone like me, who was born
outside the United States to foreign parents, is eligible to be President.
Language here, indeed, provides a firm and meaningful constraint on
conduct.
Obviously not all clauses of the Constitution are as narrowly drawn
as this provision. For example, the Fourth Amendment prohibits unrea-
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sonable searches and seizures. What is unreasonable is subject to judg-
ment. But it is not a judgment made in a vacuum. It must be made in
light of almost two centuries of interpretation and our shared notions of
individual privacy and personal autonomy. I submit that, regardless of
what any particular judge may subjectively think, a warrantless night-
time search of every house on a particular block would not be reasonable.
Again, marginal cases may present difficult line-drawing problems, but
this doesn't negate the fact that the language of the Constitution does
provide a meaningful constraint for the large majority of cases.
Another very important principle is that judges must deal squarely
with precedent. They may not ignore it or distinguish it on an insubstan-
tial or trivial basis. Few of us write on a truly clean slate and what has
gone before provides an important constraint on what we can do in cases
now before us. Precedent, like language, frequently leaves room for judg-
ment. But there is a difference between judgment and dishonesty, be-
tween distinguishing precedent and burying it. Judges get incensed when
lawyers fail to cite controlling authority or when they misstate the hold-
ings of cases they cannot distinguish in a principled fashion. When
judges do this, it is doubly shameful, because the results are far more
damaging. I've heard lawyers complain, with good reason, that within
the same circuit there will be two lines of authority on the very same
subject. The two lines go off in different directions without acknowledg-
ing each other's existence, like ships passing in the night. In such cir-
cumstances lawyers have much difficulty in advising clients how to
conduct their affairs, the rule of law depending on who the judges in their
case happen to be.
Let me give you a final principle that's not frequently recognized as
such, but is, in my view, extremely important. We all view reality from
our own peculiar perspective; we all have biases, interests, leanings, in-
stincts. These are important. Frequently, something will bother you
about a case that you can't quite put into words, will cause you to doubt
the apparently obvious result. It is important to follow those instincts,
because they can lead to a crucial issue that turns out to make a differ-
ence. But it is even more important to doubt your own leanings, to be
skeptical of your instincts. It is frequently very difficult to tell the differ-
ence between how you think a case should be decided and how you hope
it will come out. It is very easy to take sides in a case and subtly shade
the decision-making process in favor of the party you favor, much like
the Legal Realists predict. My prescription is not, however, to yield to
these impulses with abandon, but to fight them. If you, as a judge, find
yourself too happy with the result in a case, stop and think. Is that result
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justified by the law, fairly and honestly applied to the facts? Or is it
merely a bit of self-indulgence?
Judging is a job where self-indulgence is a serious occupational haz-
ard. One must struggle against it constantly if one is to do the job right.
I guess what I ultimately object to in the teachings of the Legal Realists
and their modem day disciples is that they play on judges' already in-
flated egos by telling them that they can follow their leanings with aban-
don and everything will be all right. Everything will not be all right.
There are awesome forces in our society that extract a heavy price for
judicial self-indulgence. Judges have traditionally held a special place in
the public's mind as arbiters of our disputes and protectors of our indi-
vidual freedoms. But judges can only do that job if they are trusted. In
standing up for our Constitution, judges are frequently called upon to
make decisions that are highly unpopular: releasing convicted criminals,
striking down legislation that has wide public support, and letting Nazis
march in neighborhoods populated with survivors of Auschwitz. By and
large, the public has been willing to accept decisions like these because
they trust judges when they say that the Constitution requires this, be-
lieving that the unpopular result serves a higher principle that protects
all of us.
Woe be us when that trust in the judiciary is lost. If the public
should become convinced-as many academicians apparently are-that
judges are reaching results not based on principle but to serve a political
agenda, unpopular decisions will become not merely points of dissatisfac-
tion but the impetus for far-reaching changes that will affect our way of
life for years to come, perhaps permanently.
The signs are on the horizon and ought not be ignored. Throwing
judges out of office because of how they voted on cases, rather than reser-
vations about qualifications or personal integrity, seems to me a very seri-
ous cause for alarm. Also highly alarming are the recent battles in the
Senate over the appointment of the Chief Justice, Judge Bork, Justice
Thomas and some of the judges of the lower federal courts. Judicial ap-
pointment and tenure has suddenly become a political football in a way
that has serious implications for our way of life. It will not stop there. I
predict that if the current climate continues, we'll see further attempts to
fiddle with the jurisdiction of the federal courts, or to limit the scope of
judicial review or to circumscribe the appointment or removal process.
The independence of the judiciary will be undermined or lost, and with it
will go the important functions it performs in our constitutional scheme
of government.
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This is not inevitable. We can all help reverse this trend. Many of
you are now in or soon will have positions of great influence. You're
involved in making government policy, or helping to appoint judges, or
arguing important cases, or writing legislation, or commenting on the
development of the law. Many of you are or will become judges. What
you say and do will make a great deal of difference, and the ethos you
carry into the profession will determine in which direction that influence
will be exercised. You can take with you the cynical view, spawned in
the halls of academia, that anything goes. Or you can use your consider-
able talents to defeat that view.
I urge you to do the latter. Cynicism is as dangerous as it is easy. It
is far more difficult to argue in support of reason and principle, but it is
vital that you do so. If you start by clerking, challenge your judge when-
ever you think he is yielding to self-indulgence. Whisper in his ear, as in
Caesar's, "Remember you are a mortal and therefore fallible." If you
work for the government, make sure the positions you take are legally
and morally defensible. If you go into private practice, don't just make
any argument your client is willing to pay for on the hope that the judge
might be foolish that day. If you go into academia, criticize judicial self-
indulgence wherever you see it and teach the next generation to do the
same. Whatever you do, respect the law and respect yourself.
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